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deployed in more than 150 countries. David Vine, author of Base Nation: How US Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World, reports that as of 2015, the U.S. had 686 bases in 74 countries. There are so many bases, the public doesn’t even know the true total. That is not the only issue—even a definitive count of bases would include a wide range of facilities. “Base” itself is an umbrella term that includes locations referred to as “post,” “station,” “camp,” or “fort” by different military bodies. While 686 base sites are quite a figure in its own right, that tally strangely excludes many well-known U.S. bases, like those in Kosovo, Kuwait, Qatar. Less surprisingly, the Pentagon’s count also excludes secret (or secretive) American bases, like those reported in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Syria. It would be rational to say the US has a military presence wherever it uses unmanned aerial vehicles to strike targets. The US is conducting drone strikes in Yemen, Syria, Pakistan. According to official information provided by the Department of Defense (DoD) and its Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) there are about 40,000 US troops, and 179 US bases in Germany, over 54,000 troops in Japan and 109 bases, tens of thousands of troops, with hundreds of bases, all over Europe. Over 28,000 US troops are present in 85 bases in South Korea. In August 2017, over 12,000 US troops were present in numerous bases in Afghanistan.
1. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

1) an umbrella term, 2) secret (or secretive) American bases, 3) quite a figure in its own right, 4) an unmanned aerial vehicle, 5) to conduct drone strikes. 2. Answer the questions about the text in writing.

1) What is the difference between the “post,” “station” or “camp”?

2) How many countries had American military bases in 2015?

3) Why the base in Kosovo not included in the Pentagon count?

4) What were the countries with the secret American military bases?

5) How many American bases were in Germany and Japan?

6) What was the US active duty personnel number in 150 countries?

3. Translate the text aurally.

4. Translate into English aurally. 1) Крупнейшая военная база в Европе «Кэмп Бондстил» площадью 3,86 кв. км была построена в 2000 году в Косово на территории, оторванной от Сербии в результате агрессии НАТО. 2) Площадь американской базы Рамштайн в Германии в три раза превышает территорию Кэмп Бондстил только потому, что там находятся несколько взлетно-посадочных полос и много ангаров для тяжелых самолетов. 3) В Кэмп Бондстил раположен штаб группровки войск «Восток», телевизионный центр ВС США. 4) В 19 км западнее центра Токио на базе Йокота, территория которой в 1,8 раза больше Кэмп Бондстил, в 2017 г. были расположены штаб войск США в Японии, радиовещательный центр ВС США и 14000 американских военнослужащих.

5. Write a paper of 130-150 words on the US global military expansion history (1918-2017).
Russian Railway Service Corps

Russian Railway Service Corps. – Washington: Government printing office, 1922, Part 1, pp. 27-30; 1928, Part 3, р.31.
In May 1917, the US President Thomas Woodrow Wilson realized a task of the top secret Grand Strategy, which had an objective of conquering Siberia. He sent a group of five American experts headed by John F. Stevens on a secret mission to Russia. The group went from Vladivostok to Petrograd on a train gathering information about Trans-Siberian railway stations. J.F. Stevens returned to Vladivostok and went to Petrograd once more on a train to gather extra information about the Trans-Siberian railway. In September 1917, he sent a secret cablegram from Vladivostok to Washington urging to expedite the formation of Siberia`s civil administration under the cover of Russian Railway Service Corps (RRSC). On September 20, 1917, the chairman of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense Daniel Willard requested the Secretary of State to transit to John F. Stevens, who was then at Vladivostok, a cablegram: "Arrangements are being made rapidly as possible to raise, equip, and forward units of railroad men you ask for… perhaps 100 men of this force will be ready to leave within the next two weeks." On September 22 and October 9, 1917, the US government formed the Siberia civil administration under the legend of RRSC. The American government paid the wages and expenses of RRSC officials, but they didn`t get anything from the US Army budget. The RRSC 350 men were organized as a special corps outside of the US Army. In order that American officials should have the necessary prestige in their dealings with the Russians each of these officials was given the US officer`s uniform for his personal use abroad. American officials in Siberia were originally uniformed similar to the United States Army officers with the exception that they wore a rolled collar and the letters "R. R. S." instead of "U. S.". The recruiting of the corps was done under the direction of the Director General of Military Railways, who appointed George H. Emerson, then general manager of the Great Northern Railway, as the corps commander, and requested him to secure the men for the corps. In January 1918, the first group of 110 RRSC officials arrived at East China railway headquarters (Harbin, Manchuria) - an integral part of the Trans-Siberian railway. In March 1918, 350 American officials came to Siberia. They governed Trans-Siberian railway stations from Omsk to Vladivostok with the help of about 90,000 American, British, Canadian, Japanese, Italian soldiers and France`s 70,000 Czechoslovak Legion soldiers, who were paid the French army monthly wages starting January 1, 1918. Each RRSC official de-facto performed railway station`s military commander duties. Special corps staff was ordered back home because of admiral Kolchak’s white guard army defeat, and on the 15th of June, 1920 the 63 remaining American officials sailed from Vladivostok back to the USA.
1. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

1) the necessary prestige in the dealings with the Russians, 2) the US officer`s uniform for personal use abroad, 3) to secure the men for the corps, 5) the Council of National Defense. 2. Answer the questions about the text in writing.

1) Did the 1857 Grand Strategy have an objective of conquering Siberia?

2) Who sent five American experts on a secret mission to Russia?

3) Why did five American experts go on a train from Vladivostok to Petrograd?

4) How many times J.F. Stevens went on a train to Petrograd from Vladivostok in August – September 1917?

5) When did J.F. Stevens send a cablegram to Washington urging to expedite the formation of Russian Railway Service Corps?

6) Why was every RRSC official given American officer`s uniform for personal use abroad?

7) Was RRSC the part of the US Army?

8) Who paid wages and expenses of the RRSC`s officials?

9) Why did the first group of 110 RRSC officials come to Harbin?

10) Did Manchuria railways belong to Trans-Siberian railway?

3. Translate the text in writing.

4. Translate into English aurally. 1) Американские СМИ сто лет распространяли дезинформацию, чтобы скрыть факт оккупации Сибири Америкой. 2) СМИ США для обмана населения России утверждали, что в Сибири было всего 1500 американских солдат, скрывая, что американские офицеры командовали 150-тысячной группировкой своих союзников из Канады, Европы, Японии и 100-тысячной армией белогвардейцев. 3) Особенно тщательно распространяли легенду о «мятеже» чехословацкого легиона, скрывая, что этот легион с 1.1.1918 г. подчинялся командованию Франции и выполнял французские приказы о захвате станций Транссиба. 4) Сто лет США блокировали сведения, что формирование в России из пленных чехословацкого легиона было тайной операцией спецслужб США для захвата Сибири чужими руками.

5. Present aurally the general idea of the text in 4-6 sentences. 6. Write the text`s summary and its 5 key words in English.

‘We came, we saw, he died’: NATO Intervention in Libya

RT, October 20, 2016

On March 19, 2011 the U.S., the UK, France, Germany and Italy sent their military jets to bomb Libya – a country with huge reserves of oil. On April 29, 2011 NATO jets bombarded Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi`s house in Tripoli killing Gaddafi`s son and three of his grandchildren. On August 21, 2011 the American, British, Saudi Arabia and Qatar special operations units backed by about 60,000 foreign and Libyan mercenaries entered Libya`s capital Tripoli and started siege of the government compound. Gaddafi addressed the Libyan people via the state TV and vowed to fight to the end. Gaddafi in an audio address called on his supporters to continue resistance against the NATO intervention. On September 1, 2011 Colonel Gaddafi left Tripoli with 10 men of his inner circle. He went in a truck convoy to his home town of Sirte. Gaddafi was forced to change places every four days in order to avoid being hit by NATO airstrike. On September 15, 2011 British prime-minister David Cameron on a plane came to Benghazi – a city on the western coast of Libya. He was accompanied by France`s President Nikolas Sarkozy. They met with the Libyan pro-Western separatist leaders, who fought against the Gaddafi government. On September 19, 2011 the foreign and Libyan mercenaries began to hit the center of Sirte city with heavy missiles. Colonel Gaddafi fled the city but his convoy of 50 trucks was hit by the NATO airstrike. The Libyan leader Colonel Gaddafi was injured in the leg. Later he was pinpointed and captured by the special operation unit. He was abused by mercenaries including sexually, and brutally killed. On the day following Gaddafi’s capture, his dead body, covered in blood was transferred to the city of Misrata, where it was put on display in a local storage freezer. Fox News and CNN globally transmitted Gaddafi`s body in the freezer video news to frighten the leaders of the Third World countries. The most striking reaction to the death of Libyan leader came from the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who said “we came, we saw, he died.” That phrase altered Julius Caesar famous words Veni, Vidi, Vici.

1. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

1) huge reserves of oil, 2) the special operations units, 3) to be pinpointed and captured, 4) to put a dead body on a display in a storage freezer. 2. Answer the questions about the text in writing.

1) What countries started bombing Libya on March 19, 2011?

2) What forces started the siege of the government compound in Tripoli?

3) Why did Gaddafi address the Libyan people via the state TV?

4) Was it safe for Colonel Gaddafi to fled the Sirte city in a convoy of 50 trucks?

5) Why did mercenaries abuse Colonel Gaddafi after his capture?

6) Why did Fox News and CNN globally transmit video news of the Gaddafi`s dead body in the freezer?

7) What was the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaction to the death of Libyan leader?

3. Translate the text aurally.

4. Translate into English aurally. 1) В 2010 году руководитель Ливии полковник Каддафи объявил план создать федерацию арабо-африканских стран численностью 200 млн. человек для противодействия давлению и грабежу Запада. 2) Он также заявил о намерении Ливии начать расчеты международной торговли в золотых динарах, отлитых из ливийского золота. 3) Говоря о плане создать золотой динар, французский президент Франсуа Саркози заявил, что «ливийцы замахнулись на финансовую безопасность человечества». 4) Пресса Франции сообщала, что президент Ф. Саркози перед нападением НАТО на Ливию тайно получил 100 млн. евро от полковника Каддафи, оформленные фиктивными контрактами с тремя французскими фирмами якобы на подготовку празднования 40-летия ливийской революции 1 сентября 2011 года.
President Obama UN Speech Transcript

By POLITICO Staff 09/28/2015

«…Today, we see the collapse of strongmen and fragile states breeding conflict, and driving innocent men, women and children across borders on an epoch epic scale. Brutal networks of terror have stepped into the vacuum. Technologies that empower individuals are now also exploited by those who spread disinformation, or suppress dissent, or radicalize our youth. Global capital flows have powered growth and investment, but also increased risk of contagion, weakened the bargaining power of workers, and accelerated inequality. How should we respond to these trends? There are those who argue that the ideals enshrined in the U.N. charter are unachievable or out of date -- a legacy of a postwar era not suited to our own. Effectively, they argue for a return to the rules that applied for most of human history and that pre-date this institution: the belief that power is a zero-sum game; that might make right; that strong states must impose their will on weaker ones; that the rights of individuals don’t matter; and that in a time of rapid change, order must be imposed by force. On this basis, we see some major powers assert themselves in ways that contravene international law. We see an erosion of the democratic principles and human rights that are fundamental to this institution’s mission; information is strictly controlled, the space for civil society restricted. We’re told that such retrenchment is required to beat back disorder; that it’s the only way to stamp out terrorism, or prevent foreign meddling. In accordance with this logic, we should support tyrants like Bashar al-Assad, who drops barrel bombs to massacre innocent children, because the alternative is surely worse.

The increasing skepticism of our international order can also be found in the most advanced democracies. We see greater polarization, more frequent gridlock; movements on the far right, and sometimes the left, that insist on stopping the trade that binds our fates to other nations, calling for the building of walls to keep out immigrants. Most ominously, we see the fears of ordinary people being exploited through appeals to sectarianism, or tribalism, or racism, or anti-Semitism; appeals to a glorious past before the body politic was infected by those who look different, or worship God differently; a politics of us versus them. The United States is not immune from this. Even as our economy is growing and our troops have largely returned from Iraq and Afghanistan, we see in our debates about America’s role in the world a notion of strength that is defined by opposition to old enemies, perceived adversaries, a rising China, or a resurgent Russia; a revolutionary Iran, or an Islam that is incompatible with peace. We see an argument made that the only strength that matters for the United States is bellicose words and shows of military force; that cooperation and diplomacy will not work. As President of the United States, I am mindful of the dangers that we face; they cross my desk every morning. I lead the strongest military that the world has ever known, and I will never hesitate to protect my country or our allies, unilaterally and by force where necessary.…

Let me give you a concrete example. After I took office, I made clear that one of the principal achievements of this body -- the nuclear non-proliferation regime -- was endangered by Iran’s violation of the NPT. On that basis, the Security Council tightened sanctions on the Iranian government, and many nations joined us to enforce them. Together, we showed that laws and agreements mean something. But we also understood that the goal of sanctions was not simply to punish Iran. Our objective was to test whether Iran could change course, accept constraints, and allow the world to verify that its nuclear program will be peaceful. For two years, the United States and our partners -- including Russia, including China -- stuck together in complex negotiations. The result is a lasting, comprehensive deal that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, while allowing it to access peaceful energy. And if this deal is fully implemented, the prohibition on nuclear weapons is strengthened, a potential war is averted, our world is safer. That is the strength of the international system when it works the way it should.

That same fidelity to international order guides our responses to other challenges around the world. Consider Russia’s annexation of Crimea and further aggression in eastern Ukraine. America has few economic interests in Ukraine. We recognize the deep and complex history between Russia and Ukraine. But we cannot stand by when the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation is flagrantly violated. If that happens without consequence in Ukraine, it could happen to any nation gathered here today. That’s the basis of the sanctions that the United States and our partners impose on Russia. It's not a desire to return to a Cold War. Now, within Russia, state-controlled media may describe these events as an example of a resurgent Russia -- a view shared, by the way, by a number of U.S. politicians and commentators who have always been deeply skeptical of Russia, and seem to be convinced a new Cold War is, in fact, upon us. And yet, look at the results. The Ukrainian people are more interested than ever in aligning with Europe instead of Russia. Sanctions have led to capital flight, a contracting economy, a fallen ruble, and the emigration of more educated Russians. Imagine if, instead, Russia had engaged in true diplomacy, and worked with Ukraine and the international community to ensure its interests were protected. That would be better for Ukraine, but also better for Russia, and better for the world -- which is why we continue to press for this crisis to be resolved in a way that allows a sovereign and democratic Ukraine to determine its future and control its territory. Not because we want to isolate Russia -- we don't -- but because we want a strong Russia that’s invested in working with us to strengthen the international system as a whole.

Similarly, in the South China Sea, the United States makes no claim on territory there. We don't adjudicate claims. But like every nation gathered here, we have an interest in upholding the basic principles of freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, and in resolving disputes through international law, not the law of force. So, we will defend these principles, while encouraging China and other claimants to resolve their differences peacefully. I say this, recognizing that diplomacy is hard; that the outcomes are sometimes unsatisfying; that it's rarely politically popular. But I believe that leaders of large nations, in particular, have an obligation to take these risks -- precisely because we are strong enough to protect our interests if, and when, diplomacy fails.…

Look around the world. From Singapore to Colombia to Senegal, the facts show that nations succeed when they pursue an inclusive peace and prosperity within their borders, and work cooperatively with countries beyond their borders. That path is now available to a nation like Iran, which, as of this moment, continues to deploy violent proxies to advance its interests. These efforts may appear to give Iran leverage in disputes with neighbors, but they fuel sectarian conflict that endangers the entire region, and isolates Iran from the promise of trade and commerce. The Iranian people have a proud history, and are filled with extraordinary potential. But chanting “Death to America” does not create jobs, or make Iran more secure. If Iran chose a different path, that would be good for the security of the region, good for the Iranian people, and good for the world. Of course, around the globe, we will continue to be confronted with nations who reject these lessons of history, places where civil strife, border disputes, and sectarian wars bring about terrorist enclaves and humanitarian disasters. Where order has completely broken down, we must act, but we will be stronger when we act together. In such efforts, the United States will always do our part. We will do so mindful of the lessons of the past -- not just the lessons of Iraq, but also the example of Libya, where we joined an international coalition under a U.N. mandate to prevent a slaughter. Even as we helped the Libyan people bring an end to the reign of a tyrant, our coalition could have and should have done more to fill a vacuum left behind. We’re grateful to the United Nations for its efforts to forge a unity government. We will help any legitimate Libyan government as it works to bring the country together.…

The people of our United Nations are not as different as they are told. They can be made to fear; they can be taught to hate -- but they can also respond to hope. History is littered with the failure of false prophets and fallen empires who believed that might always makes right, and that will continue to be the case».
1. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

1) the fragile states, 2) the ideals enshrined in the U.N. charter are unachievable, 3) power is a zero-sum game, 4) strong states must impose their will on weaker ones, 5) the rights of individuals don’t matter, 6) the international order must be imposed by force, 7) the information is strictly controlled, 8) a politics of us versus them, 9) to deploy violent proxies, 10) the might always makes right. 2. Answer the questions about the text in writing.

1) Did Washington administration resolve disputes through international law in 1999, 2003, 2011?

2) What did Washington perceive as old enemies in 2015?

3) What was the meaning of president Obama`s words «complex history between Russia and Ukraine»?

4) Where did Iran use proxies in 2015?

5) What did president Obama mean by the words «lessons of Iraq»?

6) Did the US take part in 2011 war in Libya to end the reign of a tyrant, prevent a slaughter of Lycians?

7) What did Obama imply by the words «fallen empire»?

3. Translate the text aurally.

4. Translate the text in writing beginning with the words «That same fidelity» and ending with the words «system as a whole».
5. Translate into English aurally. 1) Б. Обама в речи в ООН говорил, что США «не хотели изолировать Россию», однако Америка и ее союзники приняли против России финансовые и экономические санкции, и позже Б. Обама заявил, что эти санкции якобы «порвали в клочья» экономику России. 2) В речи Б. Обама лгал, что США воевали в Ливии якобы «по мандату ООН», хотя мандат разрешил только создать над Ливией безполетную зону. 3) Барак Обама лгал, что Америка провела войну в Ливии, чтобы «предотвратить убийства /ливийцев/», а не для того, чтобы предотвратить введение полковником Каддафи в оборот золотого динара. 4) Полковник Каддафи не был «тираном», поскольку накануне агрессии НАТО ливийское правительство давало квартиры молодоженам, платило безработному ежемесячную помощь, которая соответствовала 600 долларам.

6. Write a paper of 130-150 words on Obama`s and Trump`s policy to Russia.

Obama's Last National Security Strategy

Foreign Affairs, March 2, 2015

It is a thankless job to issue a new National Security Strategy (NSS), as U.S. President Barack Obama did this month. Its creation is a churn of dozens of drafts circulated among scores of hapless staffers, each of whom is tasked with name checking his or her very specific issue. There’s little room for prioritization or bold new ideas; any artful turns of phrase are quickly ground into merciless governmentese. Although the intent of the National Security Strategy (produced 16 times since 1987) is to provide stars to steer by for the many executive agencies tasked with ensuring the nation’s security, it more often seems to serve as a magnet for stored-up foreign policy criticism. When a document has to cover, well, everything, there will be something in it to hate for just about everyone. Here, the jury has already come back strong: “Leading from behind!” “Iranian appeasement!” “Strategic Patience = Strategic Weakness!” “The Leading from behind U.S. can’t even define its own enemy!” (the last one is from Russian state television).

But beyond the knee-jerk criticism, the president’s National Security Strategy is not just a bowl of rice pudding. Although readers won’t find a strategy aimed at a unitary threat with clear ends, ways, and means, there is a pretty coherent philosophy at work. This strategy is the second and last of Obama’s presidency, and it rightly describes a world beset by challenges and in dire need of American leadership (“lead,” “leader,” and “leadership” appear 94 times in the context of the United States’ role in the world). It is not “leading from behind,” as the president’s restless and war-ready critics love to claim. Nor is it hard-charging unilateralism. Instead, the world of President Obama’s National Security Strategy is one in which the United States’ economic and military might serve as the bedrock of strong, participatory, and rules-based global institutions. It’s smart multilateralism—working within the international system while also being willing to bear the burden of defending it, although not always with military power. This is likely as close as we’ll get to an “Obama Doctrine.” As the president told West Point graduates in a major foreign policy address in 2014: “Here’s my bottom line: America must always lead on the world stage. If we don’t, no one else will. The military that you have joined is and always will be the backbone of that leadership. But U.S. military action cannot be the only—or even primary—component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail. And because the costs associated with military action are so high, you should expect every civilian leader—and especially your Commander-in-Chief—to be clear about how that awesome power should be used.”

It’s no coincidence, then, that the National Security Strategy places significant focus on economic strength and security, the well from which U.S. military might ultimately springs. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) each receives prominent attention. So, do global energy markets and future growth trends. As the document observes, “The American consumer cannot sustain global demand.” It’s a thoughtful approach that strives to cast an eye beyond the geopolitical brushfires of the day and into planning years into the future. Indeed, a good way to characterize the document is “thoughtful.” Critics have been quick to dismiss Obama’s so-called strategic patience as empty and feckless. But in fact, strategic patience is the strategy’s way of acknowledging that the total impact of global trends—or even of American interventions—can’t be assessed in days, weeks, or even single congressional terms.

As the document states, “There are historic transitions underway that will unfold over decades. This strategy positions America to influence their trajectories, seize the opportunities they create, and manage the risks they present.” Just as international events move at their own deliberate speed, the impact of American policies can still resonate years or decades after the fact. The United States can’t identify a problem, shock-and-awe its way to victory, and expect to come home with all the loose ends neatly tied up. The world simply doesn’t work that way. Accordingly, the United States’ incremental, long-term rebalance to the Asia-Pacific (which still continues slowly on course) is an example of Obama’s strategic patience at work, no matter how many times Washington’s chattering class eagerly pens its epitaph. On the other hand, the terrible consequences of the United States’ 2003 cowboy-hooting, gun slinging invasion of Iraq illustrate precisely the reason a policy of strategic patience must exist today. That said, although the philosophy of the National Security Strategy is sound—U.S. leadership in a robust multilateral system, strategic patience, and levelheaded calculation in the service of a global order that benefits the United States as much as anyone else—the document does a poor job of describing this strategy in practice. Perhaps this is because, in many places, there is a mismatch between the strategy’s words and U.S. actions (or inaction).

The current withdrawal plan in Afghanistan does not reflect strategic patience. U.S. actions to date in Ukraine do not square with the stated objectives to “deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary.” The Syrian civil war and the mass killings of civilians over the past years contradict the United States’ stated intent to “act preventively before situations reach crisis proportions.”

Critics have also rightfully inveighed that much of the National Security Strategy reads like a Christmas list of aspirations with no prioritization. U.S. power isn’t limitless, as the strategy clearly emphasizes; so, what gets top billing? The strategy fails to make the tough calls. But perhaps the biggest obstacle for Obama’s strategy is that the deliberate, thoughtful approach simply runs against the reality of both American and international politics. The pace of world events doesn’t always wait for the gears of American policymaking to spin into action. Often, the most deliberate action must also be quick and decisive. Robust efforts to strengthen a moderate Syrian opposition in 2011 or 2012 before it fractured into warring jihadist factions could arguably have placed the United States and its partners in a much stronger position today, as could more decisive action against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) as it gathered momentum in early June 2014.

On the other end of the spectrum, Obama’s publicly announced glide slopes and timetables for withdrawal from Afghanistan may represent a good reading of U.S. domestic politics, but they run contrary to the strategic patience necessary to ensure success in a long-lasting stabilization mission. They also run contrary to the deliberate strategy endorsed by the National Security Strategy. Recent announcements regarding military assistance to Ukraine, an authorization to use military force against ISIS, and hints of a shift in the drawdown in Afghanistan may signal a recognition of these mismatches. With two years left in the White House, perhaps this document will mark a few course corrections.

Ultimately, the drafting and publication of a new National Security Strategy can be an inherently contradictory enterprise, pitting grand strategic aspirations against uncomfortable and inconvenient geopolitical realities (Duke University Professor Peter Feaver provides excellent insight into some of the challenges he faced in drafting the second strategy under George W. Bush). One of the document’s most important functions is bureaucratic, providing hooks that savvy executive agencies can use to fast-track their own initiatives and craft the sub strategies that should provide the detail so many critics crave. The document can be useful, certainly, but will not quite be the vista of top-level meetings, imposing oak tables, and snappy Cold War phrases such as “containment” or “détente” that a title such as “National Security Strategy” evokes.

The president’s second National Security Strategy articulates a belief in a peaceful, rules-based international order; it also reaffirms the fact that none of this can happen without the leadership of the United States. For scholars seeking to trace broader themes in the president’s foreign policy strategy, the document promises good historical value. But to expect it to provide definitive answers to every crisis that now simmers across the globe—that’s asking a bit much of any NSS.

1. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

1) a churn of dozens of drafts, 2) to provide stars to steer, 3) leading from behind, 4) Iranian appeasement, 5) a bowl of rice pudding, 6) beyond the knee-jerk criticism, 7) Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail. 8) shock-and-awe its way to victory, 9) Washington’s chattering class, 10) a mismatch between the strategy’s words and U.S. actions, 11) a Christmas list of aspirations with no prioritization, 12) pitting grand strategic aspirations against uncomfortable and inconvenient geopolitical realities. 2. Answer the questions about the text in writing.

1) Who was drafting the second National Security Strategy for George Bush Jr.?

2) Why was the CIA 2011-2013 covered war in Syria not mentioned in unclassified 2013 National Security Strategy?

3) Why did critics say 2013 NSS is resembling a Christmas list of aspirations?

4) Why did 2013 withdrawal plan in Afghanistan contradict the US policy in 2017?

5) Did the US policy in 2017 repeat 2013 objective to “deter Russian aggression”?

6) Did the US 2017 policy continue long-term rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific?

3. Translate the text aurally.

4. Translate into English aurally. 1) Если документ о стратегии национальной безопасности (СНБ) США на четыре года не имеет грифа секретности, то его подготовили для дезинформации иностранцев. 2) В документе СНБ США 2015 г. не говорилось о войне ЦРУ в Сирии под прикрытием, которой американцы управляли с базы Инджирлик в Турции и базы Хуссейн в Иордании. 3) Стратегия нацбезопасности без грифа секретности не упоминала, что секретная стратегия геополитики в 2015 г. предусматривала захват Дамаска 250-тысячной группировкой наемников, вооруженных США и их союзниками. 4) Автор статьи в журнале Форин эффэйрз правильно заметила, что подписанная Б. Обамой стратегия нацбезопасности содержала лишь общие слова и декларативные заявления.

5. Write the text`s summary and its 5 key words in English.

6. Write a paper of 130-150 words on the text`s general idea.

Draft Non-Paper/ v14 CONFIDENTIAL

A short and medium-term comprehensive strategy

for the new Ukraine


Short-term: The next three to five months

Medium-term: The next three to five years

I. The Starting Point

1. Putin prefers a financial collapse and political infighting that would destabilize all of Ukraine to a military victory that would give him control over part of Ukraine. This is corroborated by the fact that he twice converted a military victory to a cease-fire that recognized the facts on the ground without depriving him of his first mover advantage.

2. Minsk 2 brings Putin close to attaining his preferred outcome. He is now reverting to military de-escalation in the belief that he has accomplished his mission and in the hope that he can avoid a renewal of the economic sanctions when they expire in July.

3. The financial and political deterioration of Ukraine makes Putin the winner. This is doomed to continue or accelerate unless Ukraine and its allies can agree on a comprehensive strategy that will deprive Putin of his first-mover advantage. Just as Putin does not obtain Merkel’s and Hollande’s signature executing his strategy, before the same applies in reverse to the strategy below.

II. The Strategy

Ukrainian and allied leaders should agree on the following principles:

1. In the absence of adequate support from its allies, the new Ukraine is no match for Putin’s Russia.

2. It is in the collective self-interest of Ukraine’s allies to enable the new Ukraine not only to survive but to prosper; and as long as they can agree on a way of providing adequate support without getting involved in a direct military conflict, they should be able to prevail against Putin’s Russia.

3. While it would be more desirable to have Russia as a partner than an enemy, that is impossible as long as Putin persists in his current policies.

4. It will be much costlier, particularly for Europe, to defend itself against the threat that a victorious Putin regime will pose when the new Ukraine collapses, than to provide adequate support to the new Ukraine while it is still alive.

5. Keeping the new Ukraine alive and helping it to succeed should take precedence over sanctions against Russia. Sanctions must be maintained and if necessary strengthened as long as Putin persists in overt military attacks on Ukrainian soil; but they harm not only the Russian but also the European and global economy. They also reinforce Putin’s narrative that blames Russia’s problems entirely on the implacable hostility of the West. This helps him to retain the support of the Russian people and to consolidate his power. By contrast, a functioning democracy in Ukraine that manages to reform its economy even in the midst of Russian aggression would turn Putin’s narrative into a lie that no amount of propaganda could cover up. More and more Russians would want to follow Ukraine’s example.

6. Therefore Ukraine’s allies should treat Ukraine as a defense priority, not as another Greece. They should declare that they will do whatever it takes to help the new Ukraine succeed short of getting involved in direct military confrontation with Russia or violating the Minsk agreement.

III. The short-term: the next three months 

A. What Ukraine must deliver

1. Restore the fighting capacity of Ukraine without violating the Minsk agreement.

2. Restore some semblance of currency stability and a functioning banking system.

3. Maintain unity among the various branches of government.

4. Preserve the institutional integrity and independence of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU)

5. Provide tangible evidence that the government knows where the leaks in the budget are and knows how to stop them.

6.  Prepare and initiate a convincing economic and political reform program that both donors and investors would find attractive.

7. Present an impressive case at a donors’ and investors’ conference in three months’ time with two months leeway.

B. What the allies must deliver

1. Help restore the fighting capacity of the Ukrainian army without violating the Minsk Agreement. The allies must imitate Putin in the practice of deniability to deprive him of his first-mover advantage.

2. Europe must reach a new framework agreement that will allow the European Commission to allocate up to €1 billion annually to Ukraine, charging only 9% to the budget and to use it also for other than balance of payments support. This requires a political decision by Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande, as signatories of the Minsk Agreement, and the expenditure of considerable political capital to overcome legal hurdles and reach unanimity.

3. Be ready to commit some or all of these funds if the Ukrainian reform program justifies it. To turn the tables on Putin, Ukraine needs to be converted from a source of political risk to an attractive investment destination. That will require larger EFF’s and reinsurance for political risk insurance at attractive rates. ………………….

George Soros 

A self-appointed advocate of the new Ukraine March 12, 2015
1. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

1) the financial and political deterioration of Ukraine, 2) the implacable hostility of the West, 3) allies should treat Ukraine as a defense priority, 4) restore the fighting capacity of Ukrainian army, 5) the allies must imitate the practice of deniability, 6) to turn the tables on Russia, 7) a source of political risk, 8) a self-appointed advocate. 2. Answer the questions about the text in writing.

1) What is the strategy`s median term period?

2) Why was Ukraine no match for Russia. in the absence of the support from the US and its allies?

3) Why did the US sanctions harm not only Russia but also the European and global economy?

4) What was George Soros interest in self-appointing himself to be an advocate of the new Ukraine?

5) Why did the US want to increase the fighting capacity of the Ukrainian army? 

6) Why did Ukraine become a defense priority for the US in Europe?

7) Did Soros strategy have a success in converting Ukraine to an attractive investment destination? 

3. Translate the text aurally.

4. Translate into English aurally. 1) В марте 2014 г. Дж. Сорос прибыл в Киев и договорился с послом США создать группу 5-6 иностранных советников для «помощи» правительству новой Украины. 2) Добытые хакерами документы Дж. Сороса говорили о его плане назначить бывшего командующего НАТО генерала Уэсли Кларка советником президента Украины. 3) Во время визита в Киев в марте 2014 г. Дж. Сорос в номере своего отеля 18 раз конфиденциально вел переговоры с руководящими деятелями правительства Украины. 4) В Киеве президент Украины 11.11.2015 г. лично наградил Дж. Сороса орденом Свободы «за значительные личные заслуги в укреплении международного авторитета украинского государства».

5. Present aurally the general idea of the text in 4-6 sentences. 6. Write the text`s summary and its 5 key words in English.

7. Write a paper of 150-170 words on Washington`s sanctions against Russia and its 2014-2017 geopolitical objective in Ukraine. Explain the meaning of George Soros` statement: «Keeping the new Ukraine alive and helping it to succeed should take precedence over sanctions against Russia. Sanctions must be maintained and if necessary strengthened…»

S.94 - Counteracting Russian Hostilities Act of 2017

www.congress,gov.Congress.gov/Library of congress
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