• SEC. 205. STATEMENTS OF POLICY WITH RESPECT TO UKRAINE .
  • SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PIPELINES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION .
  • SEC. 233. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENT IN OR FACILITATION OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ASSETS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION .



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    S. 94

    To impose sanctions in response to cyber intrusions by the Government of the Russian Federation and other aggressive activities of the Russian Federation, and for other purposes.



    TITLE II—COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
    SEC. 204. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA AND OCCUPATION OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA.

    (a) United States Policy Against Recognition Of Territorial Changes Effected By Force Alone. — Between the years of 1940 and 1991, the United States did not recognize the forcible incorporation and annexation of the three Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union under a policy known as the “Stimson Doctrine”. (b) Non-Recognition Of Sovereignty Of Russian Federation Over Crimea And Independence Of South Ossetia And Abkhazia.—No Federal agency shall take any action or extend any assistance that recognizes or implies any recognition of — (1) the de jure or de facto sovereignty of the Russian Federation over Crimea or its airspace or territorial waters; or (2) the de jure or de facto independence of South Ossetia or Abkhazia, or the airspace or territorial waters of South Ossetia or Abkhazia, from Georgia.



    SEC. 205. STATEMENTS OF POLICY WITH RESPECT TO UKRAINE.

    (a) In General. — It is the policy of the United States to further assist the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity to contain, reverse, and deter the aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. That policy shall be carried into effect, among other things, through a comprehensive effort, in coordination with allies and partners of the United States where appropriate, that includes sanctions, diplomacy, and assistance, including lethal defensive weapons systems, for the people of Ukraine intended to enhance their ability to consolidate a democracy based on the rule of law and with a free market economy and to exercise their right under international law to self-defense. (b) Additional Statement Of Policy.— It is further the policy of the United States — (1) to use its voice, vote, and influence in international fora to encourage other countries, including United States allies, to provide assistance that is similar to assistance described in subsection (a) to Ukraine; (2) to ensure that any relevant sanctions relief for the Russian Federation is contingent on the recognition by the Government of the Russian Federation of the sovereignty of Ukraine over Crimea as well as timely, complete, and verifiable implementation of the Minsk Agreements, especially the restoration of Ukraine’s control of the entirety of its eastern border with the Russian Federation in the conflict zone; (3) to support Georgia’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders and to recognize the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as regions of Georgia occupied by the Russian Federation; and (4) to further call on the Government of the Russian Federation to take steps to fulfill all the terms and conditions of the 2008 cease-fire agreements with the Government of Georgia, including returning military forces to pre-war positions and ensuring access to international humanitarian aid to all those affected by the conflict.


    1. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

    1) to contain, reverse, and deter the Russian Federation, 2) allies and partners of the United States, 3) assistance, including lethal defensive weapons systems, for the people of Ukraine, 4) to recognize the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as regions of Georgia occupied by the Russian Federation, 5) returning military forces to pre-war positions. 2. Answer the questions about the text in writing.

    1) What is the policy known as the “Stimson Doctrine”?

    2) What document prohibits the US recognition of the Russian Federation sovereignty over Crimea?

    3) Why does S.94 document not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence?

    4) What is S.94 document section number that names sanctions against Russia?

    5) Why does S.94 document names only one point of the Minsk Agreements?

    6) What is the meaning of the phrase “to assist the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity»?

    7) What is the meaning of the phrase «to contain, reverse, and deter the aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine»?

    8) What was the earliest US document on containment?

    3. Translate the text aurally.

    4. Translate into English aurally. 1) Конгресс США 29.9.2017 г. принял документ о новых санкциях против России. 2) В черный список США включили 278 юридических лиц России. 3) Срок предоставления банками США новых кредитов российским банкам сократили с 30 до 14 дней. 4) Начиная с 28.11.2017 года, срок кредитования российских предприятий энергетического сектора был сокращен с 90 до 60 дней.


    H.R.3364 - Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act www.congress.gov Text – H.R.3364 – 115 Congress (2017-2018) Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act/

    SEC. 232. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PIPELINES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

    (a) In General.—The President, in coordination with allies of the United States, may impose five or more of the sanctions described in section 235 with respect to a person if the President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment described in subsection (b) or sells, leases, or provides to the Russian Federation, for the construction of Russian energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology, information, or support described in subsection (c) — (1) any of which has a fair market value of $1,000,000 or more; or (2) that, during a 12-month period, have an aggregate fair market value of $5,000,000 or more. (b) Investment Described. — An investment described in this subsection is an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of the ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines. (c) Goods, Services, Technology, Information, Or Support Described. — Goods, services, technology, information, or support described in this subsection are goods, services, technology, information, or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of the construction, modernization, or repair of energy export pipelines by the Russian Federation. SEC. 233. SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTMENT IN OR FACILITATION OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ASSETS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION. (a) In General.—The President shall impose five or more of the sanctions described in section 235 if the President determines that a person, with actual knowledge, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, makes an investment of $10,000,000 or more (or any combination of investments of not less than $1,000,000 each, which in the aggregate equals or exceeds $10,000,000 in any 12-month period), or facilitates such an investment, if the investment directly and significantly contributes to the ability of the Russian Federation to privatize state-owned assets in a manner that unjustly benefits— (1) officials of the Government of the Russian Federation; or (2) close associates or family members of those officials. (b) Application Of New Sanctions. —The President may waive the initial application of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a person only if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees — (1) a written determination that the waiver — (A) is in the vital national security interests of the United States; or (B) will further the enforcement of this title; and (2) a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation is taking steps to implement the Minsk Agreement to address the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015, by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany, the Minsk Protocol, which was agreed to on September 5, 2014, and any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

    1. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

    1) the ability of the Russian Federation to construct energy export pipelines, 2) the ability of the Russian Federation to privatize state-owned assets, 3) close associates or family members of those officials, 4) the vital national security interests of the United States. 2. Answer the questions about the text in writing, 5) any successor agreements that are agreed to by the Government of Ukraine.

    1) What were the US means of economic warfare?

    2) When did Washington impose sanctions on the USSR energy export gas pipelines?

    3) What was the objective of imposing sanctions on family members of Russian officials?

    4) Was Russia the party to the Minsk Agreement signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 11, 2015?

    5) What was Washington`s Russian policy ultimate objective?

    3. Translate the text aurally.

    4. Translate into English aurally. 1)  В ноябре 1962 г. страны НАТО объявили запрет на продажу в СССР труб большого диаметра для строительства газопровода в Восточную Германию. 2) Президент США Рональд Рейган 29 декабря 1981 г. объявил о торговых санкциях против СССР, в том числе о запрете продажи труб большого диаметра для строящегося газопровода из Западной Сибири в Германию. 3) В ответ на санкции в Челябинске был построен «Стан 1020» для производства труб диаметром 1020 мм, а в 2005 г. на Выксунском заводе было начато производство труб для газопроводов диаметром 1420 мм. 4) По сравнению с 1962 годом санкции 2016 года стали сильнее бить по странам Евросоюза, поскольку за 2016 г. их годовая торговля с Россией уменьшилась на 15% до 200,4 млрд. долларов.


    Russia’s strength annoys US haters

    https://www.rt.com/news/402088-russia-annoys-us-ryabkov/


    On September 5, 2017 the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, who spoke to RT on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in China, acknowledged that for the past few years Russia’s relationship with the US has gone from bad to worse” and suggested that the problem lies in the American establishment, which cannot stand any nation not playing its tune. There are people in the US establishment who hate Russia so much, that they cannot live without smearing it, Ryabkov told RT in an exclusive interview. He said the fact that Russia remains strong and independent despite all their efforts makes them really mad. “Since 2013, we have endured 47 rounds of American sanctions imposed for this or that reason or for no reason at all. But Russia didn’t become weaker due to them. We came through the negative period after the drop of energy prices and are back on the track of economic growth. This literally makes the people who hate Russia mad,” Sergey Ryabkov said. “There are plenty of those in the US – let me call things by their proper names,” he added. “There is an entire group of politicians, commentators, reporters who simply cannot help mentioning Russia negatively in some context. Otherwise they would lose sleep. It’s like a drug that requires higher doses to avoid withdrawal.” “After the end of Cold War, they thought they rule uncontested, but then signs came that not everyone was willing to play in an orchestra directed from Washington; that some countries or people would rather play solo, or in a duet, or in a quintet, [as BRICS nations]. That there are various forms of play, and each may be interesting to somebody. For some reason, this is perceived as undermining America’s core interests and is rejected,” he said.
    1. Translate the text aurally on the spot.

    2. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

    1) the sidelines of the summit, 2) Russia’s relationship with the US has gone from bad to worse”, 3) the American establishment, 4) the sanctions imposed for no reason at all, 5) to call things by their proper names, 6) a drug requires higher doses to avoid withdrawal, 7) to rule uncontested, 8) to play in an orchestra directed from Washington. 3. Answer the questions about the text in writing.

    1) What countries were members of BRICS in 2017?

    2) Who was responsible for the US – Russia relationship deterioration?

    3) How many rounds of sanctions did America endure on Russia in 2013-2017?

    4) What was the meaning of the phrase «to play in an orchestra directed from Washington»?

    5) Was the 2015 energy price sharp drop a natural course of events or was it a special operation to hit the Russian budget?

    4. Translate into English aurally. 1) Посол США в России Джон Хантсмэн 4.12.2017 г. в интервью радио Коммерсант Эф-Эм сказал, что Россия – это «враг № 1» для Америки. 2) Председатель объединенного комитета начальников штабов США 8.7.2015 г. во время выступления в сенате назвал Россию «величайшей угрозой для США» (greatest threat to the USA). 3) Серый кардинал США - американский банкир Э.М. Хауз (Edvard M. House), тайно командовавший президентом США Вудро Вильсоном, и имевший личную комнату в Белом доме, 28.4.1917 г. сказал: «Россия – угроза Европе» во время обсуждения в Нью-Йорке с министром иностранных дел Британии Альфредом Бальфуром секретной карты послевоенного устройства мира, на которой от России отрезали несколько кусков и разделили всю территорию на зоны постоянной оккупации – «сферы влияния». 5). Слова коммюнике саммита глав стран Североатлантического альянса 9.7.2016 года, что «Россия фундаментально бросает вызов НАТО» (fundamentally challenges NATO), повторяли постулат «Россия – угроза Европе».

    5. Present aurally the general idea of the text in 4 sentences.


    Global drone war

    https://www.lawfareblog.com/drones-are-new-face-us-foreign-policy-what-good-are-they


    Years of debate on drone strikes programs show that many Americans have reservations. People are concerned that drone strikes devalue non-American lives, dangerously expand executive power and drive terrorism and anti-Americanism. On May 23, 2016 civil society activists shouted anti-American slogans during a demonstration in Multan against a US drone strike in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Baluchistan.  Yet do we actually know much about drone strikes’ political effects? No. Here’s what we can say: There are two publicly known classified programs that operate drones and fire weapons from them, military and CIA, but research into the strikes’ effects is constrained by government secrecy and limited access to areas where the strikes occur. Even the number of civilians killed is contested. The White House estimates 116 deaths in 2009-2015 while independent reporters suggest it is as high as 800. In 2016, Wikileaks announced that every Tuesday National Security Council discussed Targeted killing program, which used drones. We can say drones offer some obvious advantages. Strikes can achieve short-term goals like killing leaders of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula leader Jalal Baleedi in Yemen. They provide more accurate targeting than crewed armed flights and sea-based weaponry, although they are certainly not perfect. They are often less expensive than manned tools like planes and ships. But there is profound disagreement over the strikes’ political—that is, strategic—effects. Whether drone strikes reduce or increase terrorism is murky. The fog is unlikely to clear soon. Even in this uncertain environment and without hard data, we can draw some conclusions. For example, drone strikes are similar to Special Forces in their direct targeting ability in remote locations but are less likely to create domestic opposition to the use of force because they don’t put U.S. lives directly at risk. They also evoke less nationalistic backlash because they do not require putting U.S. forces in another state’s territory. As a political scientist studying the political uses of force, I suggest it’s possible to better understand drone strikes by analyzing them within the context of a military strategy—or how a state thinks about assuring its own security. By doing that, we can begin to determine if these strikes support U.S. goals, or not, and how they compare to other means of attaining the same ends.

    There are several different ways of thinking about U.S. strategy. For our purposes, it makes the most sense to consider two types—restraint and selective engagement. These approaches share a cautious attitude toward the use of force. Both agree that the wealth and resources of the European and Asian landmass make it the center of U.S. political and economic interactions and the location where any truly dangerous security threat to the United States would arise. Where the two approaches differ is on the role of international opinion and nonstate actors in U.S. security. These are key points in the drones` debate. President Obama was often characterized as a proponent of restraint: He recognizes that the use of force may have higher costs than benefits and that its downstream effects can be incalculable. This recognition was behind his reluctance to intervene directly in internal conflicts such as Syria. In a world where the U.S. is implementing policies derived from a strategy of restraint, military force is a potentially high-cost tool. Drone strikes give the United States a smaller overseas military profile than do land-based conventional forces. This is a political gain. As MIT’s Barry R. Posen argues, “a high and martial profile helps to generate antipathy to the United States, which may create a more supportive environment for violent and determined enemies.” Drone strikes’ greater accuracy and lower profile give them the edge when policymakers are concerned about popular opinion and the potential costs of the use of force. Drone strikes can also reduce perceptions of the United States as a bully whose military behavior may increase radicalization. Yet drone strikes against sovereign states underline U.S. unilateralism and the country’s fearsome power-projection capabilities. This is likely to contribute to other states’ fear of the United States as the most powerful state in the world, one unconstrained by others’ interests and wishes. Concern about U.S. strikes can drain liberal partners’ goodwill, potentially affecting U.S. interests in other areas. Germany, for example, has in the past limited intelligence sharing with the United States because of legal and ethical concerns about drone strikes outside battlefields.



    Drone strikes of the type I discuss here apparently occur only in five states: Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Syria and Libya—though Libya’s frail government requested U.S. help against the Islamic State, or ISIS, before the most recent round of strikes and Pakistan is widely believed to privately support the strikes. Despite the big controversy, these strikes’ political advantages are small because of limited U.S. interests outside the Eurasian continent and the limited overseas terrorism threat to U.S. interests. What kind of worldview would push the U.S. away from the use of drones under ‘selective engagement’ strategy? Drone strikes have an even more limited role in a strategy of selective engagement. This approach emphasizes the role of states in U.S. security rather than nonstate actors and popular opinion. It focuses on conventional U.S. military power as an instrument enabling state cooperation, so drones’ smaller footprint becomes a political drawback. In a strategy of selective engagement there is little need to attack terrorists overseas because their limited capabilities pose little threat. The major counterterrorism goal is preventing attacks on the homeland, particularly any using weapons of mass destruction. The primary counterterrorism tools are shared police work and intelligence, argues Brandeis University’s Robert J. Art. Relying on other states to deal with threats within their own territory and using Special Operations Forces and covert action as a complement to partner forces means a minimal role for drone strikes. The most controversial drone strikes target groups and individuals in states without a public U.S. military presence and without that state’s public permission. Within hot war zones, drone strikes are another standoff weapon for achieving tactical effects.

    How are the drone programs likely to change under president Trump? How will our new leadership see our place in the world? Hillary Clinton’s worldview is robustly liberal interventionist. This view challenges both restraint and selective engagement in its far broader definitions of U.S. interests and threats. Clinton supported the Iraq War and sees an activist global leadership role for the U.S., including its military. Her views lead one to expect more U.S. uses of force in more places based on the belief that military force easily translates into the power to achieve political goals. Drone strikes could increase, given their appealingly lower profile, lower cost and greater accuracy. But they could easily be eclipsed by more overt military intervention into internal conflicts that Clinton believes threaten U.S. values and interests, such as Syria and Libya. Donald Trump’s views on how to assure U.S. security are unclear at best, contradictory at worst. Some predict an expanded role for U.S. air power potentially including drones against ISIS in a Trump presidency. Turning from high politics to popular views, it’s clear that Americans are concerned about these kinds of drone attacks—apparently unilateral, apparently violating the 350-year-old norm of state sovereignty and conducted without a formal justice process. This reflects well on a public wondering what the U.S. role in the world should be. But assessing the value of drone strikes requires looking beyond the attacks themselves to first identify and prioritize U.S. interests and threats. Only in that context is it possible to decide whether one supports or opposes drone strikes for what they may gain the United States politically.
    1. Find the Russian equivalents of the following.

    1) two classified drone operation programs, 2) crewed armed flights, 3) to create domestic opposition to the use of force, 4) drone strikes against sovereign states underline the US fearsome power-projection capabilities, 5) the states without a public U.S. military presence, 6) robustly liberal interventionist worldview, 7) the military force easily translates into the power to achieve political goals, 8) drone strikes violate state sovereignty and are conducted without a formal justice process. 2. Answer the questions about the text in writing.

    1) What agency had drones classified program?

    2) What was an estimated number of civilians killed by drone strikes in 2009-2015?

    3) Where was the Targeted killing program discussed every Tuesday, according to Wikileaks?

    4) Did drone strikes reduce terrorism in 2009-2015?

    5) What was the U.S. global drone war objective?

    6) Where was the geopolitical center of the U.S. political and economic interactions?

    7) Why was a drone strike considered to have a «lower profile»?



    3. Translate the text aurally.

    4. Translate the text in writing beginning with the words «There are several different ways»
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